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Abstract 
Despite an international consensus on the importance to limit State aid spending, 
large amounts of resources are still devoted to a wide variety of subsidies to firms. 
A sizable literature studies the relationship between general government spending 
and the proximity of elections, mostly documenting a positive link. In addition, other 
studies verify whether this strategy of increasing government expenditure pays off 
in terms of number of votes. We focus on one type of government spending that 
can be quite vulnerable to becoming ‘targeted spending’, i.e. subsidies to firms. We 
empirically test the relationship between the amount of subsidies granted to firms 
at the local level and local support for incumbent parties in the regional 
government. To that end, we make use of subsidy data derived from financial 
statements on 2008 and Flemish election results of 2004 and 2009. We find that 
the total amount of subsidies as well as subsidies per capita granted in 2008 
positively correlate to support for incumbent parties 2009, meaning that voters 
appear to reward subsidy granting politicians. 
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Governments spend a substantial amount of resources, allocating subsidies to 
private firms, seemingly in order to correct market failures or to support specific 
regions or sectors. However, there also seems to be a consensus that (taking into 
account a few exceptions) State aid should be forbidden as it can lead to costly 
subsidy races between countries and in the long run can create inefficient 
companies (Hancher et al. 2006). Furthermore, in practice, we see that these 
subsidies are often ineffective or inefficient in a sense that goals are not (fully) 
reached or that the benefits achieved do not justify the costs incurred.  
Therefore, it is argued that mechanisms should be implemented to control or 
restrict wasteful spending on subsidies. Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) suggest 
that domestic political control mechanisms are not the best option. In theory, 
political accountability works as follows: citizens vote as a function of their 
evaluation of government performance. Incumbent parties are electorally punished 
for a ‘bad’ performance, and a ‘good’ performance is rewarded with additional 
support in the ballot box. In doing so, incentives are created for politicians to 
implement a policy perceived to be ‘good’ in order to remain in office. As already 
mentioned, subsidies are not the most efficient way to allocate government’s 
resources, but are perceived by voters as “evidence of effort on the part of the 
politicians” (Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006, p. 514). If voters reward this effort 
with additional votes, the political control mechanism creates a perverse effect: it 
then becomes rational for politicians to spend money on wasteful subsidies as this 
would “improve their chances of re-election” (Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006, p. 
514). 
The aim of this paper is to empirically test whether subsidies indeed are related to 
electoral outcome, a relationship which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet 
been directly tested. It serves as a further specification of the broader literature on 
pork-barrel politics that studies politicians who direct spending in order to win 
additional votes. Subsidies are chosen as they are probably more sensitive to 
become ‘targeted’ spending projects than many other types of government 
spending. The relationship is tested at the local level. The economic voting 
literature shows that electoral support for national governments is greater in local 
jurisdictions where economic prosperity is higher (Pattie et al., 1997; Johnston et 
al., 2000, 2002). Hence, if subsidies have an electoral effect, the support for 
governments should be higher in local jurisdictions where the amount of allocated 
subsidies is higher. We compare the 2009 electoral results of the incumbent 
parties of the Flemish government between the different electoral cantons and 
hypothesize that a high amount of subsidies allocated to a specific region 
increases local electoral support for the incumbent parties. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 1 the ineffectiveness 
of many state aid measures is discussed as well as the obvious international desire 
to diminish or even abolish this kind of spending. Furthermore, we look at literature 
on the determinants of election outcome and the importance of a local context. The 
last part of this section reviews the literature on pork-barrel politics and thus 
discusses the relationship between the level of government spending and 
upcoming elections as well as the influence of this spending on vote shares of 
incumbent parties. The second section specifies our model and describes the data. 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in section 3. A conclusion and 
discussion can be found in section 4. 
Literature  
Subsidies are granted for a variety of reasons such as support to R&D and aid to 
firms in difficulty. For many of these objectives, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different measures has been studied, often resulting in quite negative findings. 
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Frequently, goals are not reached, or when they are, the costs are out of 
proportion. Examples of this are the crowding out effect of R&D subsidies1, the 
ineffectiveness of many rescue and restructuring measures2 and the hugely costly 
aid to boost employment.3 Next to this wide evidence of inefficiencies, an 
international consensus seems to exist among politicians and organizations about 
the desire to diminish State aid measures. This becomes evident in the European 
Union’s State aid policy and the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. From a theoretical point of view, Collie 
(2000 and 2002) makes a well-reasoned plea for a serious reduction of State aid 
over time in the EU, based on welfare grounds. 
We then may ask why governments keep spending resources to the current extent 
in this often inefficient way. While searching for explanations, we find several 
possibilities. A first one is provided by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). 
Governments support inefficient firms simply because these firms have a strong 
lobby. In a way, the process of integration in the European Union stimulates this 
demand for government support. Integration increases market performance but, at 
the same time, higher competition threatens to force non-efficient firms out of the 
market. These firms will then ask for aid from their national governments. 
Furthermore, penalties for acting against EU State aid rules are not always severe 
enough, possibly leading to situations in which, despite welfare being reduced, 
granting aid is an equilibrium outcome (Martin and Valbonesi 2008). Another 
explanation is offered by Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) and represents the 
theoretical foundation for our empirical analysis: subsidies are seen by voters as 
an effort of politicians. Voters will reward politicians for this effort in the ballot box. 
In their turn, politicians are aware of this and grant subsidies to show their 
commitment and thereby gain support for future elections. Normally, the 
mechanism of domestic political accountability would control politicians, but in this 
case it does not and it even provides an incentive for wasteful spending.  
Political accountability builds on the ‘carrot and stick’ model: a good performance 
(as perceived by voters) leads to electoral gain for incumbent parties, contrary to a 
bad performance. This hypothesis has been intensively investigated in the 
economic voting literature. From this literature, we conclude that economic 
prosperity – generally measured by variables such as unemployment rate, inflation 
and economic growth - has positive effects on electoral results for incumbent 
parties (for a review see Mueller, 2003 and Nannenstad and Paldam, 1994). As 
wasteful spending is shown to be a sign of rather bad governance, we would 
expect the accountability mechanism to punish politicians for this. However, here 
the mechanism works in the opposite way. Subsidies are not evaluated as being 
wasteful but as an effort of politicians which generates extra votes. This 
encourages politicians to continue subsidising.  
Economic prosperity as measured in the voting literature can be perceived at 
different levels. Voters can assess the performance of the national economy 
(voting socio-tropically) and they can look at the prosperity of their own household 
(voting ego-tropically). Research has shown that both levels are important although 
voters seem to be more socio-tropic than ego-tropic (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 
2000). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the local context wherein these 
evaluations are made also plays an important role (Books and Prysby, 1999). 
                                                                                                         
1 For a review on the econometric literature on crowding out of R&D subsidies, see David et al. (2000). 
In addition, Lach (2002) and Gelabert et al. (2009) find that these kinds of subsidies are only effective 
when granted to small firms or firms with low levels of appropriability.  
2 London Economics (2004), Chindooroy (2007) and Glowicka (2008). 
3 Bergström (1998) and Tannenwald (2002). 
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Through the local media, social interaction and personal experiences, voters in 
states with low economic prosperity would be more confronted with negative 
information, which affects their assessment of the government’s economic 
performance.  
Not only assessments but also voting behaviour is affected by the local context. 
Controlling for national and personal assessment, Pattie et al. (1997) find that, for 
the 1992 UK elections, voters who thought that their region was worse off were 
less likely to vote Conservative (the incumbent party at that time) and more likely to 
vote Labour (the main opposition party). Their results are confirmed by Johnston et 
al. (2000, 2002) who find that, controlling for national, personal and regional 
assessments, economic prosperity in a region (measured by the unemployment 
rate) increased support for incumbent parties in that specific region. However, 
Berry and Howell (2007) state that evidence of retrospective voting in national 
elections seems to be steadier than in local settings. From Duch and Stevenson 
(2006) we learn that economic voting is not found to influence all elections, but a 
clear reason for this has not yet been found. They find varying evidence for 
economic voting depending on national context and time.  
The accountability mechanism has also been tested with a wider range of 
variables. Hagerty (2006) adds measures for the quality of life to this ‘responsibility 
hypothesis’ and finds that crime rates are important in predicting election outcome. 
However, the influence of crime rates tends to be smaller than that of the economic 
condition. 
Finally, the relationship between government spending and vote shares has been 
discussed in the literature. There is evidence suggesting that governments indeed 
seem to believe that subsidies positively impact on voting behaviour. In addition, it 
has been discussed whether this kind of spending to win additional votes actually 
pays off. The phenomenon is referred to as pork-barrel politics.  
Verdier (1995) explains that politicians grant subsidies in order to create a (stable) 
network of supporters. Kwon (2005) documents the fact that the level of 
government expenditure in South Korea depends on the proximity of future 
elections. Also, it is known that in developing countries, white elephants (funded 
projects with a negative social surplus) are used in an attempt to influence election 
outcome. Robinson and Torvik (2005) show that certain politicians are able to 
derive very large political benefits from this kind of projects. 
Keeping the above findings in mind, Keefer and Knack (2007) make an interesting 
addition. They find that public investment is higher in regimes with little political 
checks. However, they do say that further research is necessary to determine the 
cause: is it to compensate for incompetence of the regime or is the money spent 
on ‘preferential’ projects? Also Manzetti and Wilson (2007) state that nations with 
weaker democratic regimes are more likely to have a high amount of targeted 
spending to win votes.  
Important to note is also that smaller regions are believed to be more sensitive to 
pork-barrelling. Hauk and Wacziarg (2007) provide evidence that infrastructure 
spending is disproportionately allocated to smaller states in the US. Previously, 
Herron and Shotts (2003) already documented that certain funds or projects which 
are claimed to attribute electoral benefits were allocated to the smaller states.  
Thus, politicians seem to believe that ‘targeted’ spending might earn them extra 
votes and often act accordingly. It is off course important to study whether 
incumbents really benefit in the ballot-box of this kind of spending. Several studies 
such as the ones by Feldman and Jondrow (1984) and Stein and Bickers (1994) 
failed to find general evidence. Stein and Bickers (1994) argue that redefining the 
general model is necessary and show that it are mainly politicians in office that do 
not feel confident about re-election that engage in this kind of spending, and more 
importantly that it are mostly politically attentive voters that respond to it. Moreover, 
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Alvarez and Saving (1997), Levitt and Snyder (1997) and Leigh (2008) find that 
high spending results in more votes. The second team finds that it takes about $14 
000 in federal funding to win an additional vote. The last author distinguishes 
between types of spending and finds the strongest relationship between funding 
and additional votes in the Roads to Recovery Program, about the same amount 
that was found by Levitt and Snyder (1997). 
Specification and data 
In the literature review, we find evidence that State aid is often ineffective and that 
it is accepted that it should mostly be forbidden. Nevertheless, huge amounts of 
State aid are spent each year by national governments. For example, in 2010 the 
EU-27 spent 0.6% of aggregated GDP on State aid.4 This, together with the 
evidence from the literature on pork-barrelling, leads us to believe that in many 
cases there could be political motives to government spending. In this research we 
want to look at one specific form of spending, namely subsidies to firms as we 
believe that they could be especially sensitive to becoming ‘targeted’ spending in 
order to win votes. In a way, it boils down to the fact that politicians grant subsidies 
even though overall believe is that these subsidies should only be allowed in 
exceptional circumstances. Therefore, keeping in mind that a link exists between 
subsidies and electoral competition, we think that a realistic explanation is 
presented by Dewatripont and Seabright (2006): politicians grant subsidies to show 
their commitment and in this way try to gain more support in next elections. In this 
theory subsidies are perceived by voters as an effort of politicians, signalling a 
caring government. This is rewarded with electoral support in next elections. The 
voting decisions are made on a point in time when voters are aware of the subsidy, 
but not of its effect, which in most cases can only be evaluated after a few years. In 
the present paper we want to empirically investigate whether subsidies indeed 
affect voting behaviour and hypothesize that differences in electoral support for 
incumbent parties between the different regions can partly be explained by 
differences in the amount of subsidies granted to firms located in these different 
regions.  
We thus start from the theoretical model presented by Dewatripont and Seabright 
(2006) as we believe that voters reward politicians for their effort. Subsidies to firms 
are used to test this as they are a form of spending likely to be used for pork-barrel 
politics. People working in the aid receiving firms are aware of the fact that 
subsidies were granted to these firms. This may not always be true, but it will be in 
the majority of cases. Some types of subsidies are namely more likely to be 
communicated towards the employees than others. For example, aid for R&D or 
rescue and restructuring aid will usually be known in the entire firm, whereas 
several smaller subsidies may be not. The employees of the receiving firm are 
likely to inform family and close friends and thus in this way make sure the 
information spreads. The more firms receive subsidies, the more inhabitants of a 
certain area are aware of the ‘caring’ incumbent politicians. Also, as pointed out in 
the literature review, pork-barrelling is observed more in smaller states as 
described by Hauk and Wacziarg (2007). Indeed, the effect of pork-barrelling will 
logically be larger were local communities are small and social interaction is often 
quite high. Where there are many contacts with the neighbourhood and within 
recreational organizations, information will spread more easily. Moreover, press in 
Flanders is very local and helps spreading these facts by reporting all kinds of local 
news, including economic news that is locally relevant.  
For the empirical analysis, we use election data of the Flemish region for 2004 and 
2009. Flanders represents a typical example of a Western democracy, with a 
proportional multiparty system, located within the European Union. It provides for a 
                                                                                                         
4 European Commission (2010). This percentage excludes support to railways and crisis measures.  
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good test case as data on subsidies can be calculated per firm (see below). 
Flanders is one of the three Belgian regions besides Wallonia and the (smaller) 
Brussels region. The Belgian regions have considerable autonomy. Their major 
competences are in the field of economic policy and education. Every five years, 
elections are held to choose representatives for the Flemish parliament. Within this 
parliament, a majority forms the government. After the 2004 elections, the 
government was formed out of three cartels: CD&V-N-VA (cartel of the Christian 
democrats and a nationalist party), VLD-Vivant (a liberal cartel) and Sp.a-Spirit (a 
left wing cartel). The next elections for the Flemish government in 2009 resulted in 
a new coalition of CD&V, Sp.a and N-VA.5  
Flanders (13 682 km²) is divided into five electoral districts. Each of these districts 
consists of several cantons (103 in total). In 2009 there lived, on average, 59 821 
people in a canton with a minimum of 3 672 and a maximum of 490 492.6 To 
analyze the impact of subsidies, we study the electoral results of parties that made 
up the government between 2004 and 2009. These results differ substantially 
between cantons as can be seen in Figure 1. Vote share changes are calculated 
for every canton. On average, incumbent parties lost 1 percentage point of their 
electoral support. However, in one canton they lost 14 percentage points of their 
vote shares, whereas they also won 8 in another.  



















                                                                                                         
5 Cartel partners CD&V and N-VA decided to go separately to the 2009 elections. The two other cartels 
making up the Flemish government after 2004, chose a new name for the 2009 elections.  
6 The difference in size of the cantons implies that the perception of localness differs for voters within 
different cantons. A small canton is much more ‘local’ than a larger canton. Johnston et al. (2000), 
however, demonstrate that the response of voters to local unemployment levels is scale invariant. 
Whether unemployment was measured at a very small scale (around 500 people) or at the constituency 
scale (around 70 000 people on average) it still had a negative effect on the electoral support of 
incumbent parties. We see that including a dummy variable for cantons containing a big city does not 
impact on our results (see below). All in all, all cantons can be labeled ‘small’ compared to the small 
units of observations found in the literature. 
Also, we include voting results of previous elections as an independent variable. Local dimensions are 
in this way incorporated on the ‘independent’ side. And, despite the large variance in canton size, they 
all are small comparing to other countries. Including a population variable in the analysis does not lead 
to significance. Furthermore, it does not change the other results.  




We hypothesize that these differences in electoral results between cantons can be 
(partly) explained by differences in subsidies granted to firms located in these 
cantons. We expect that in cantons where private firms received more subsidies, 
the electoral support for incumbent parties will be higher than in other cantons. 
This leads to the following function, estimated at the canton level: 
Votes2009 = α + β1 Votes2004 + β2 Subsidy + β3 X + ε 
Where Votes2009 stands for the vote share of all the incumbent parties at the 2009 
elections, Votes2004 is the vote share of these parties at the 2004 elections. 
Subsidy is the amount of subsidies or in a second step the subsidies per capita 
granted to firms in the canton in 2008. X is a set of socio-economic parameters 
ranking all cantons. In a second step we also look at relative change in vote share. 
Subsidies. We will focus on all subsidies to firms in Flanders, excluding other 
measures such as loans or guarantees. In Belgium, subsidies are granted by 
several levels of government and through different organizations under their 
supervision. The subsidies are linked to the elections of the regional governments, 
which grant the bulk of the subsidies. A small proportion of the subsidies is 
provided by the federal government (also directly going to the firms). However, 
from Limosani and Navarra (2001) we learn that voters can reward politicians for 
spending that occurs at a different level of government. We assume that voters do 
not really differentiate between resources coming from different levels of 
government. Through personal experience, their social network or local press, they 
are informed about the subsidies and relate this to the politicians that are in office.  
Most of the subsidy granting organizations are not willing to provide detailed 
information on this topic, the amount of subsidies they award and to whom, except 
for IWT (Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology). Therefore, we 
estimated the subsidies per firm (and subsequently calculated subsidies per 
canton) from the firms’ annual accounts.7 We include two tests, one with the 
absolute level of subsidies for which the variable is scaled by a factor 100 000 and 
one with subsidies per capita.  
The method of calculation of subsidies leads to an inclusion of all capital grants to 
firms conditionally upon being subsequently invested by the firm. It concerns 
subsidies provided by all levels of government for a variety of objectives such as 
research and development, start-up aid and sustainable development. Subsidies 
granted as a result of aid schemes8 as well as ad hoc types are included. The 
purpose is to investigate the joint influence of all these subsidies to firms.  
Flemish firms received subsidies for a total amount of €829 million in 2008. This 
represents on average a subsidy of €80 per capita. However, there are quite some 
differences between the cantons. In one canton, we find no subsidies at all. In 
another canton, subsidies amount to €2 622 per capita. In our analysis we include 
only subsidies and subsidies per capita of 2008 instead of total subsidies over the 
four years between the two elections because, as was mentioned in the literature 
review, it has been shown that governments seem to increase their spending, 
including subsidies, in the year prior to elections. Additionally, voters can be 
assumed to have short memories, rather recalling last years’ subsidies than last 
five year period’s subsidies. We expect that subsidies will positively impact on 
incumbent support following the mechanism explained above.  
                                                                                                         
7 The method of calculation of subsidies can be found in Appendix 1. 
8 On one hand, aid schemes provide the possibility for multiple firms to apply for a subsidy. They usually 
have to fulfill specified criteria in order to receive the subsidy. They are however not available to all 
firms. They can be selective, for example, in a geographical or sectoral manner. On the other hand, 
there are also ad hoc types of aid where only one company receives an aid for a certain reason.  
European Journal of Government and Economics 1(1) 
 
37
Socio-economic condition. We control for the socio-economic condition in a canton. 
As suggested in the literature, the economic condition and quality of life in a 
specific region influences the evaluation of government performance made by 
voters in that region. To control for these effects we use a socio-economic canton 
rank as proposed by Sanderson and Eggerickx (2010). A low value for the index 
represents a high ranking and thus a ‘better’ canton. This index is an overall 
performance indicator and includes a canton’s scores for different parameters, 
measuring the general well-being of inhabitants. To control for economic 
performance, income per capita and the unemployment level are taken into 
account. To have a broader picture, also measures of more general well-being are 
included such as quality of life, living environment and the availability of public 
services. These aim to quantify certain topics that are important in the daily life in 
local communities. The first two are based on quantifiable dimensions such as the 
quality of houses (measured amongst others by the number of bathrooms), built 
surface, proximity and surface of green and wooded areas, health, life expectancy 
and environmental concerns such as local emission rates. Availability of public 
services will typically measure the accessibility of several kinds of services such as 
public schools, administrative services, public nursing homes, public health care 
institutions, doctors, and public transport. Here, it is the proximity and quantity that 
is measured, as well as the availability of public buses. Each time, the partial 
scores are added and cantons are ranked according to the total score. We expect 
better socio-economic conditions to result in better electoral results for incumbent 
parties.  
Results 
By means of a classical OLS regression, we explain the number of votes that 
incumbent parties of the 2004-2009 period receive at the Flemish elections of 
2009.  
Regression results can be found in Tables 1 and 2.9 In Table 1 we look at the 
absolute value of subsidies as one of the independent variables. Table 2 shows 
results when we change to subsidies per capita. The second column of each table 
explains the joint vote share of all incumbent parties. In column three the relative 
change in vote share each time is the dependent variable.10  
First, it is clear that there is a very strong and positive link between the election 
outcome of 2004 and results of 2009. Incumbents of the 2004-2009 period are 
more likely to have many votes in a canton at the 2009 elections when they had a 
high vote share at previous elections, despite some ‘regression’ in the sense that 
high shares in 2004 tend to be followed by a loss of votes.  
Next, we take a look at subsidies and subsidies per capita going to firms. 
Throughout the four estimations, we find that there is a significant positive 
relationship between subsidies and the vote share in 2009, meaning that cantons 
that receive high subsidies the year previous to the elections reward incumbent 
                                                                                                         
9 Including a dummy variable for cantons containing one of the five province capitals does not alter 
results significantly. One could argue that this kind of variable should be included as it is not unusual for 
firms to have their headquarters in a larger city, but their main activity somewhere else. Also, cities 
typically host more workers living somewhere else. Subsidies might enter the calculations of the bigger 
cantons, but employees are from another region. Including a dummy variable for ‘undecided’ cantons, 
i.e. cantons where the largest party changed between the 1999 and 2004 elections or cantons were 
vote share for incumbents and opposition was close, does not alter the results.We also estimated our 
regressions applying robust regression techniques. The results do hardly differ from the ones presented 
(results can be obtained from the authors upon request). Including a variable to control for size of the 
cantons does not change the results. The size variable does not reach significance. An overview of all 
variables included and their sources can be found in Appendix 2. 
10 By relative change in vote share we mean the percentage change in vote share of the incumbent 
parties between the 2009 and 2004 elections: (vote share 2009-vote share 2004) /vote share2004. 
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parties with more votes than cantons that receive less subsidies. An increase of €1 
subsidy per capita, increases vote share for incumbent parties with 0.0021 
percentage points (Table 2). €80 subsidy per capita is granted on average. For the 
canton with the highest subsidies, this represents a change in vote share of 6 
percentage points, which is substantial given the number of parties participating at 
the elections. The found effect confirms expectations. The subsidies taken into 
account are the ones going to firms. These matter because they are observed by 
the voter public in the following way: many people work close to home or at least 
have many relatives and/or friends working in that region. If more subsidies are 
awarded to firms in a specific canton, we can expect that they are ‘experienced’ by 
more voters as more employees will be aware of the subsidies. Voters are 
informed by personal experience, but can also learn about the subsidies through 
their social network or local press. Then, we continue with the reasoning by 
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) that voters indeed reward politicians for 
subsidies. The subsidies are perceived as a kind of effort of politicians. The 
economic impact of the spending decision can often only be evaluated after the 
elections. Therefore, voting support is given on the basis of the spending decision 
itself and not on the actual effectiveness of the subsidy which can only be 
observed at a later moment in time and is then implicitly incorporated in the 
variable measuring general well-being.11  
Third, following the literature, we control for the socio-economic condition of the 
cantons. We expect that a good economic condition and quality of life would be 
rewarded with more votes. This is confirmed by the results for the variable 
measuring the socio-economic condition. The sign observed is negative, 
remembering that the variable is an ordinal variable, with higher values pointing at 
worse socio-economic conditions. Cantons were inhabitants have a high feeling of 
general well-being, measured as economic condition, but as well as quality of life 
and availability of public services, award more votes to incumbent parties.12  
Table 1: Results with subsidies as an absolute variable 
 Incumbents 2009 
Relative change in vote 
share 
Incumbents 2004 0.5520*** -0.0067*** 
Subsidies 0.0024** 0.000041** 
Socio-economic index -0.0153*** -0.0002*** 
Constant 33.9927*** 0.4974*** 
N 103 103 
R² 0.6223 0.5308 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
                                                                                                         
11 This paper focuses on a type of spending that is likely to be sensitive to becoming ‘targeted’ 
spending. Building on existing literature, it could be interesting to look at the effect of more general 
types of public spending. This however falls outside the scope of this paper.  
Following the method proposed by Petrarca and Padovano (2011), we also test whether there is an 
influence of the level of subsidies in neighbouring cantons. We calculate per canton the level of 
subsidies relative to the subsidies received in neighbouring cantons. This however does not seem to 
have an effect.  
12 Substituting the socio-economic index by the variables income and unemployment does not 
substantially change the found effect of subsidies on voting outcome. The variable income is positively 
correlated to voting outcome as is found in the literature. The variable unemployment shows the 
expected negative sign, but does not reach significance.  
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Table 2: Results with subsidies per capita 
 Incumbents 2009 
Relative change in vote 
share 
Incumbents 2004 0.5345*** -0.0070*** 
Subsidy per capita 0.0021* 0.0001** 
Socio-economic index -0.0143*** -0.0002*** 
Constant 35.0201*** 0.5136*** 
N 103 103 
R² 0.6122 0.5176 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
Most usual regression diagnostics do not raise concerns. When checking 
multicollinearity, we find no variance inflation factors that exceed 2. As the normally 
used threshold is 10, we conclude that there are no concerns with regard to 
multicollinearity. The augmented partial residual plots do not raise concerns about 
non-linearity. When plotting residuals versus fitted values, we see that the data 
cloud becomes somewhat thinner towards the ending which might raise concerns 
about heteroskedasticity. These are however only minor as there is no real pattern 
to be found in the plot.  
However, subsidy per capita has a few outliers. In order to check whether these 
influence the results, we run regressions with and without them and find no 
significant differences. Robust regression was also used, which provided similar 
results (see also footnote 9).  
Finally, one might be critical about the assumed direction of causality between 
subsidies and election outcome. Instead of higher subsidies leading to better 
election outcome, one could argue that more subsidies are awarded to regions 
where incumbent support was rather low in the past. Theoretically, this cannot be a 
problem in the present case as election results of 2009 are explained by subsidies 
of 2008. Nonetheless, we check endogeneity by means of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test (as one could say that subsidies are dependent on previous election results 
and that these are highly correlated to future election outcome), but conclude that 
there are no problems of that kind. In addition and perhaps most convincingly, 
when the opposite direction is tested, we find no evidence of a correlation between 
subsidies and 2004 vote share. Considering these diagnostics, results can be 
confidently interpreted.  
Conclusion and discussion 
We study the impact of subsidies to firms on election outcome in Flanders 
(Belgium). To that end, we look at the election outcome for the incumbent parties 
at the Flemish level in the 2009 elections for all 103 cantons. We find a significant 
positive relationship between the amount of subsidies and subsidies per capita 
granted to a canton’s firms and the vote share of the incumbent parties, meaning 
that voters seem to reward politicians for spending resources on subsidies.  
The motive for this paper is to uncover a possible explanation for granting 
subsidies. Apart from the overall consensus that State aid should be forbidden, 
literature provides evidence that many of the subsidies that are still in place for a 
variety of reasons are not efficient. The question then remains why governments 
keep on investing such large amounts of resources in different kinds of subsidies. 
Following the theoretical work of Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) who explain 
that subsidies are a by-product of political accountability, we show empirically that 
voters seem to reward politicians for subsidies as higher amounts of subsidies 
result in more support for the incumbent parties. We do however not judge the 
effectiveness of the subsidies.  
We also provide a better understanding of voting behaviour in general, adding an 
index containing the usual control variables that we find in the existing literature. 
Up to now, economic voting is more persistently found in research on national 
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elections than on the local level, as is explained by Berry and Howell (2007). The 
present study shows that there can be retrospective voting at the local level. We 
add the possibility that the accountability mechanism can create undesired effects 
as well when voters make a ‘wrong’ assessment on a government decision under 
the limited information that they observe as will often be the case with regard to 
subsidies. The literature on pork-barrelling is specified further as we distinguish 
one specific type of spending, namely subsidies to firms. Even in stable 
democracies and multi-member electorates, both usually less sensitive to pork-
barrel spending, awarding subsidies can improve the incumbent’s chances of re-
election. However, this is not always confirmed in existing literature. So, specific 
conditions can be defined further for this kind of spending to work. Probably, the 
small size of the cantons and the organization thereof is an important factor. 
Having relatively dense social networks and a truly local press, for example, helps 
politicians to spread information among the voter public. This makes it easier to 
bring the message across that resources were spent, and therefore, as 
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) pointed out in their theoretical model, that 
incumbents ‘care’, resulting in extra support during upcoming elections. 
For future research it would be interesting to look at this type of effect in other 
countries and especially to verify whether the ideology of the standing government 
matters for the effect of subsidies on voting outcome.  
Two remarks still need to be made: as we studied Flemish election outcomes, one 
could argue that only Flemish subsidies should have been taken into account. 
However, we included all subsidies received by firms. This is justified by the fact 
that first, most of these subsidies come from the Flemish government or an 
organization under its responsibility. Second, most voters do not distinguish 
between regional and federal funds in their evaluation of government performance. 
And even when they do, literature provides proof that it is possible for voters to 
reward politicians at one level of government for spending stemming from another 
level. A second remark, as mentioned earlier: Flanders is a very specific case and 
further research is thus necessary to check the extent of the found relationship in 
other countries.  
Quite substantial policy implications can be derived from the results obtained. As 
politicians are rewarded for subsidies by voters, they will probably put a rather high 
effort into granting subsidies. From this point of view, we can thus conclude that a 
control on State aid is absolutely essential. This control will need to be organized at 
the national as well as at the supranational levels. The European Commission, for 
example, has the jurisdiction to decide on the authorization of State aid measures 
planned by EU Member States. However, not all subsidies fall under the 
notification obligation for a variety of reasons such as no effect on trade between 
Member States, block exemptions, and the de minimis regulation. For this rather 
considerable amount of financial resources that is spent on subsidies to firms, 
there should be an independent control system in place at the national level as 
well, to ensure that there are no harming consequences stemming from subsidies 
and to control for possible misallocation as a result of political motives.  
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Appendix 1: Calculating the amount of subsidies 
received 
To calculate the amount of subsidies that each firm received, we follow Jegers and 
Theunisse (2007). They propose the following formula:  
Investment subsidies = difference in book value of investment subsidies (∆15) 
+ investment subsidies recognized as revenues (proportional to depreciation of 
subsidized asset) (9125) 
+difference in book value deferred taxes (∆168)-transfer to deferred taxes 
(680)+transfer from deferred taxes (780)13 
As subsidies increase later taxes, part of the subsidy obtained is booked as 
deferred tax. The last three terms allow us to estimate this part. The first two terms 
calculate the net subsidy received. 
Appendix 2: Variable description and sources 
Variable name Description Source 
Incumbents 2009 Independent variable 1: vote 
share of incumbent parties at 




Relative change Independent variable 3: growth 
of vote share per canton 
Own calculation from: 
http://www.binnenland.vlaander
en.be/verkiezingen 
Incumbents 2004 Vote share of incumbent parties 
in the 2004 elections (in%) 
http://www.binnenland.vlaander
en.be/verkiezingen 
Inhabitants Number of inhabitants per 
canton 





Subsidy and subsidy per capita Amount of subsidies and 
subsidies per capita going to 
each canton 
Calculated as described in 
appendix 1 
Socio-economic index Ranks municipalities according 
to their socio-economic 
performance. 
(http://knack.rnews.be/ Last 
consulted: 25. March 2010) 
Sanderson and Eggerickx, 2010 
                                                                                                         
13 Numbers between brackets refer to the codes in the Belgian annual accounts.  
